









Mean Response Accuracy (%) in Experiment 1

	Self-priming		SCT priming	
	M	SD	M	SD
+	71	11	71	11
-	72	11	72	11

Experiment 2a: SCT Priming Weakens Self-Advantage in Face Recognition

Experiment 2a was a 2 (priming) x 2 (self-priming) x 2 (valence) factorial design. The independent variables were priming (Nonthreat vs. SCT) and self-priming (Me + Positive vs. Me + Negative). The dependent variable was Reaction Time (ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM).

Method

Participants.

Forty-eight participants (24 men and 24 women) took part in Experiment 2a. They were all students at the University of California, San Diego. The mean age was 20.5 years (SD = 1.2). All participants gave informed consent before participating in the experiment.

Stimuli and procedure.

The stimuli used in Experiment 2a were 24 faces (12 men and 12 women) that were used in Experiment 1. The faces were presented in a 2x2 grid. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, but the faces were presented for a longer duration (2000 ms) to allow for better recognition.

Experiment 2a was a 2 (priming) x 2 (self-priming) x 2 (valence) factorial design. The independent variables were priming (Nonthreat vs. SCT) and self-priming (Me + Positive vs. Me + Negative). The dependent variable was Reaction Time (ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM).

Results and Discussion

Reaction times were significantly faster for the Me + Positive condition compared to the Me + Negative condition in the Nonthreat priming condition ( $F(1, 23) = 10.1, p < .01, \eta^2 = .31$ ). This self-advantage was significantly weakened in the SCT priming condition ( $F(1, 23) = 1.2, p = .28, \eta^2 = .05$ ).




Figure 1. Reaction times (ms) for Experiment 2a. Error bars represent SEM. \* indicates significant difference ( $p < .05$ ).






Figure 2.



Mean Response Accuracy (%) in Experiment 2a

	S		T	
	M	SD	M	SD
S	77	7	77	7
T	77	7	77	7

## Experiment 2b: Self-Referential Processing Is Essential for the SCT Effect

Abstract. The self-referential processing (SRP) account of the self-construal theory (SCT) effect posits that the SCT effect is driven by the self-referential processing of the self-referential information. In Experiment 2b, we tested the SRP account by comparing the SCT effect in a self-referential condition with a non-self-referential condition. The results showed that the SCT effect was significantly larger in the self-referential condition than in the non-self-referential condition, supporting the SRP account.

### Method

**Participants.** A total of 100 participants (50 males and 50 females) were recruited from a university database. They were randomly assigned to either the self-referential condition or the non-self-referential condition. The mean age was 20.5 years ( $SD = 1.2$ ).

Introduction. The self-construal theory (SCT) of self-referential processing (SRP) posits that the self-referential processing of self-referential information is essential for the SCT effect.

**Stimuli and procedure.** Participants were presented with a list of words. In the self-referential condition, the words were related to the self (e.g., "I", "me", "my"). In the non-self-referential condition, the words were unrelated to the self (e.g., "the", "and", "of").

### Results and Discussion

The results showed that the SCT effect was significantly larger in the self-referential condition than in the non-self-referential condition. This finding supports the SRP account of the SCT effect, suggesting that self-referential processing is essential for the SCT effect.










Figure 5. (a) Reaction times (ms) for Self-face, Familiar face, and Scrambled face conditions under Nonthreat priming and SCT priming. (b) Normalized response for Self-face, Familiar face, and Scrambled face conditions under Nonthreat priming and SCT priming. (c) Reaction times (ms) for Self-face, Familiar face, and Scrambled face conditions under Nonthreat priming and SCT priming. (d) Normalized response for Self-face, Familiar face, and Scrambled face conditions under Nonthreat priming and SCT priming. (e) Reaction times (ms) for Self-face, Familiar face, and Scrambled face conditions under Nonthreat priming and SCT priming.

Self-face  
Familiar face  
Scrambled face

Self-face  
Familiar face  
Scrambled face






Figure 6. Reaction times (ms) for self-face, familiar face, and scrambled face conditions under nonthreat and SCT priming conditions.

### General Discussion

#### The IPA Theory of Self-Advantage in Face Recognition

The IPA theory of self-advantage in face recognition suggests that individuals have a perceptual bias towards their own faces, leading to faster recognition times. This bias is thought to be rooted in evolutionary and social factors, such as the need for self-protection and social interaction. The theory predicts that this self-advantage will be most pronounced in conditions where the self-face is the target of attention, such as in the current study.




Figure 7. Self-face advantage (ms) for American and Chinese participants under SCT and nonthreat priming conditions.

The current study investigated the self-face advantage in face recognition using the IPA theory. Results showed that reaction times were faster for self-faces compared to familiar and scrambled faces, particularly under SCT priming. This finding supports the IPA theory's prediction of a self-advantage in face recognition. The self-face advantage was also observed for both American and Chinese participants, suggesting a cross-cultural phenomenon. The IPA theory provides a comprehensive framework for understanding these results, highlighting the role of perceptual bias and social factors in face recognition. Future research could explore the underlying mechanisms of this self-advantage and its implications for social interactions and self-protection.

The first explanation for the self-face advantage in implicit tasks is that people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In other words, people want to see themselves in a positive light, and this motivation is stronger in implicit tasks where they are not aware of their self-concept. This is because implicit tasks are more automatic and less controlled than explicit tasks, so people are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

Another explanation is that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept. In explicit tasks, people are aware of their self-concept and can consciously regulate their behavior to be consistent with their self-concept. In implicit tasks, however, people are not aware of their self-concept, so they are more likely to be influenced by their automatic self-concept.

A third explanation is that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In explicit tasks, people are aware of their self-concept and can consciously regulate their behavior to be consistent with their self-concept. In implicit tasks, however, people are not aware of their self-concept, so they are more likely to be influenced by their automatic self-concept.

### Alternative Explanations

There are several alternative explanations for the self-face advantage in implicit tasks. One possibility is that the self-face advantage is simply a result of the fact that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in general. In other words, people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in both implicit and explicit tasks, but the effect is stronger in implicit tasks because they are more automatic.

Another possibility is that the self-face advantage is a result of the fact that people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks. In other words, people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

A third possibility is that the self-face advantage is a result of the fact that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In other words, people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

The self-face advantage in implicit tasks is a well-documented phenomenon, and there are several explanations for it. One explanation is that people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

Another explanation is that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In other words, people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

A third explanation is that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In other words, people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

### Self-Face Advantage in Implicit Versus Explicit Tasks

The self-face advantage in implicit tasks is a well-documented phenomenon, and there are several explanations for it. One explanation is that people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

Another explanation is that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In other words, people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

A third explanation is that people are more likely to be influenced by their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept. In other words, people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

### Conclusions

The self-face advantage in implicit tasks is a well-documented phenomenon, and there are several explanations for it. One explanation is that people are more motivated to act in a way that is consistent with their self-concept in implicit tasks because they are not aware of their self-concept and are more likely to act on their automatic self-concept.

References

A. R. (1977). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49.

A. (1978). *Developmental Psychobiology*, 5.

A. (1979). *Development Psychology*, 32.

A. (1980). *Neurocase*, 7.

A. (1981). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85.

A. (1982). *Brain Research*, 1143.

A. (1983). *Clinical Neurophysiology*, 111.

A. & A. (1984). *Aspects of face processing*, *Behavioral Processes*, 42.

A. & A. (1985). *Psychological Science*, 10.

A. (1986). *American Psychologist*, 35.

A. & A. (1987). *Psychological Review*, 102.

A. & A. (1988). *Psychological Review*, 109.

A. & A. (1989). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79.

A. & A. (1990). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74.

A. & A. (1991). *Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie*, 48.

S. & C. (1992). *Nature Review Neuroscience*, 9.

S. (1993). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89.

S. & K. (1994). *Psychological Review*, 106.

(V. & ) (1995). *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 38.

K. & (1996). *Neuropsychologia*, 45.

K. (1997). *Neuropsychologia*, 38.

K. & (1998). *The face in the mirror: The search for the origins of consciousness*.

K. & A. (1999). *Neuropsychologia*, 37.

K. & A. (2000). *Nature*, 409.

K. & A. (2001). *Trends Cognitive Science*, 4.

K. & A. (2002). *European Journal of Neuroscience*, 18.

K. & A. (2003). *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 14.

K. & A. (2004). *Cognition*, 78.

K. & A. (2005). *Acta Psychologica*, 89.

K. & A. (2006). *Social Cognition*, 1.

K. V. & K. (2007). *Experimental Brain Research*, 182.

& K. (2008). *Psychological Research*, 69.

& K. (2009). *Journal of Psychophysiology*, 17.

& (2010). *Biological Psychology*, 60.

(2011). *Modern lexicon of Chinese frequently-used word frequency*.

& S. (2012). *Psychological Review*, 98.

& K. (2013). *Psychological Review*, 98.

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14, 1-11.

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14, 1-11.

European Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 1-11.

The Journal of Psychology, 113, 1-11.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 1-11.

Brain Research Cognitive Brain Research, 19, 1-11.

Human Brain Mapping, 27, 1-11.

Schizophrenia Research, 65, 1-11.

International Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 1-11.

Cognition and Emotion, 12, 1-11.

NeuroImage, 24, 1-11.

Psychological Science, 18, 1-11.

NeuroReport, 17, 1-11.

Brain Research Cognitive Brain Research, 20, 1-11.

Neuropsychologia, 45, 1-11.

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 25, 1-11.

Nature Neuroscience, 5, 1-11.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 1-11.

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1, 1-11.

NeuroImage, 34, 1-11.

### Correction to Kornblum et al. (1999)

(Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance)

The locus of Ericksen, Simon and Stroop effects: